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Highlights: 
► Legal doctrine on the euro sovereign debt crisis rests on strong empirical claims 
mainly reflecting solvency concerns 
► These claims may not always hold true, especially when liquidity concerns 
predominate. Hence, legal interpretation should be revisited 
► Part of the surge in the bond spreads was disconnected from fundamentals and 
country’s debt position (i.e. solvency concerns)  
► Market sentiments (linked to liquidity concerns) are dominant drivers in times of 
crisis 
► No-bailout principle and ban on monetary financing should capture non-debt related 
factors and allow for a lender of last resort 
 
Abstract 
Controversies surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis loom prominent in the 
public debate. From a legal perspective, the no-bailout rule and the ban on monetary 
financing constitute the main principles governing the legality review of financial 
assistance and liquidity measures. Interpretation of these rules are full of empirical 
claims. According to conventional legal doctrine, bond spreads only depend on the 
country’s debt position, largely ignoring other causal factors including liquidity. We test 
the hypotheses implicit in conventional legal reasoning. We find evidence that a 
significant part of the surge in the spreads of the peripheral Eurozone countries was 
disconnected from underlying fundamentals and particularly from a country’s debt 
position, and was associated rather strongly with market sentiments and liquidity 
concerns. We apply our empirical findings to the legal principles as interpreted by 
recent jurisprudence arguing that application of the no-bailout principle and the ban on 
monetary financing should be extended to capture non-debt related factors. Also, the 
empirical results suggest taking recourse to alternative legal grounds for reviewing the 
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legality of anti-crisis instruments and allowing for a lender of last resort in the euro 
zone. 
I) Introduction 
The turmoils caused by the European sovereign debt crisis in Europe have also reached 
the arena of legal scholarship. The step-wise implementation of anti-crisis instruments 
led to lively controversies among legal commentators on the legality of these measures. 
While in the literature the debate has been prominent for some time already (for an 
overview: De Gregorio Merino (2012); Steinbach (2013)), on the level of highest 
jurisprudence the controversy has culminated into an open opposition more recently – 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC, 2014) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ, 2015) have rendered judgments coming to openly different findings on the legality 
of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme.1 
At its core, the legal debate revolves around the interpretation of two legal norms laid 
down in the EU Treaties providing the ground for the legality review of EU anti-crisis 
mechanisms – the no-bailout principle, which prohibits the assumption of commitments 
of another Member State (Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)) and the ban on monetary state financing through the ECB (Article 123 
TFEU). According to conventional legal doctrine, both the no-bailout principle and the 
ban on monetary financing aim at ensuring that Member States are held liable for their 
fiscal conduct through market pressure (see, inter alia, Borger, 2016; Palmstorfer, 2012; 
Ruffert, 2011). In this vein, the no-bailout rule prohibits financial assistance because it 
                                                            
1 While the GFCC in its most recent finding (GFCC, 2016) accepts the safeguards to be taken by the ECB as 
requested by the ECJ (2015), it maintains its controversial view as to the unlawfulness of the 
announcement of the OMT (GFCC, 2016, para. 182).  
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would undermine fiscal responsibility. Similarly, the ban on monetary financing has 
been interpreted to ensure that markets apply their “assessment of creditworthiness 
and charge higher risk premiums if there are doubts about a State’s fiscal behaviour, 
resulting in increased interest rates” (Borger, 2016, p. 4). 
Legal interpretation of these norms – both in legal scholarship as well as courts’ 
jurisprudence – is full of empirical claims. In a nutshell, legal doctrine assumes a causal 
relationship exists between a country’s debt situation and the corresponding spreads. 
The doctrine further presupposes that only debt matters for a countries refinancing 
situation, that is no other determinants impact a country’s refinancing conditions – 
liquidity does not matter, nor does it affect countries’ refinancing conditions. In addition, 
there is the underlying notion that governments have exclusive control over their 
refinancing situations, as they decide on their budgetary conduct, so that non-market 
interventions are undesirable.   
The legal doctrine of these norms is thus inherently empirical and its claims can be re-
phrased as testable hypotheses. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to 
challenge the empirical validity of conventional doctrine as it is accepted in parts of legal 
scholarship and the GFCC’s jurisprudence. The goal is to gain insight for an empirically 
sound interpretation of the relevant norms. To that end, we build on empirical literature 
indicating the fragility of the above claims. In De Grauwe (2011a, b), it had been shown 
that Eurozone countries are more prone to sovereign debt crises than non-members of a 
monetary union. And De Grauwe and Ji (2013) studies a range of economic 
fundamentals and how they determine a country’s bond spreads. They show how bonds 
spreads are disconnected from underlying debt parameters during the crisis. This 
conclusion has been confirmed by Saka, et al. (2015). 
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Based on our econometric analysis, we show that conventional legal interpretation of 
the no-bailout principle as well as the ban on monetary financing should be revisited in 
light of the fragility of the empirical assumptions. Also, our empirical findings highlight 
that anti-crisis instruments such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the 
OMT programme offer the necessary flexibility to react to deviations from the 
conventional claims on the relation between debt and spreads in times of crisis, which 
supports a re-interpretation of the above norms depending on factors causal for bond 
spreads. Moreover, other legal provisions in the EU Treaties that loom less prominent in 
the discussion, such as the “emergency clause” under Article 122 TFEU might respond to 
the empirical phenomenon more accurately. Finally, an interpretation of EU rules 
allowing the ECB to act as lender of last resort would reduce the impact of non-
fundamental factors on bond spreads. 
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the legal issues surrounding the 
European debt crisis and identifies the empirical hypotheses enshrined in the 
conventional legal doctrine of the no-bailout clause and the ban on monetary financing. 
Section 3 describes the econometric testing procedure and explores the explanatory 
power of different variables. Section 4 evaluates the relevance of the empirical results 
for an interpretation of the legal norms. Section 5 concludes. 
II) Legal background 
The different types of anti-crisis instruments have gradually expanded over the last few 
years. Initially, Member States granted bilateral loans to crisis countries; then, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created; later, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was added; the European Central Bank’s Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010 and finally the 
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announcement by the ECB that it would purchase an unlimited number of government 
bonds if necessary (OMT programme). The ECJ subsequently approved these 
instruments. In Pringle, the ECJ paved the way for the creation of the ESM. Under the 
ESM, financial assistance is exceptionally permitted when such support is “indispensable 
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States” 
(ECJ, 2012, para. 142), and the grant of the support is subject to strict conditionality 
(Adam/Perras, 2013). Subsequently, the ECB’s OMT programme was brought before the 
GFCC for allegedly infringing the ban on monetary financing. The GFCC referred the case 
to the ECJ asking whether the EU treaties permit the ECB to adopt a programme such as 
OMT that would foresee purchases of government bonds on the secondary market for 
the purpose of ensuring the smooth functioning of monetary policy (GFCC, 2014). While 
the GFCC expressed its doubts as to the compatibility of OMT with the ban on monetary 
financing, the ECJ (in Gauweiler) found the ECB to remain within its monetary policy 
mandate (ECJ, 2015; Adamski, 2015) – this FCC ultimately accepted the ECJ’s acquittal of 
the ECB while upholding its view on the illegality of the OMT decision (GFCC, 2016; 
Steinbach, 2017). 
The controversy of the two courts is representative both in regard the opposing views 
within legal scholarship more broadly as well as the contradictory views on the 
empirical foundations of their jurisprudence offering a rationale for purchasing 
government bonds or not.2 This controversy is rooted in the meaning (and the 
underlying empirical assumptions) one gives to the no-bailout clause and the 
                                                            
2 Technically, the GFCC halted the proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling by the CFEU on the 
question of compatibility of the OMT programme with EU law, as only the CFEU is competent to state 
unlawfulness of EU measures. However, in its request the GFCC elaborated extensively on the alleged 
ECB’s violation of its mandate.  
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prohibition of monetary financing and which can be traced along the jurisprudence on 
the ESM (Pringle) and the OMT (Gauweiler). These reveal a number of testable empirical 
claims. The first pertains to the causal relationship between the debt position and the 
bond spreads. The interpretation of Articles 123 and 125 TFEU aiming at keeping 
budgetary discipline is widely shared in legal literature (Borger, 2016; Palmstorfer, 
2012; Ruffert, 2011). Both the GFCC and ECJ agree in principle of the “telos of market 
pressure” of the two norms begging the question on whether this claim holds 
empirically (ECJ, 2015, para. 61; GFCC, 2014, para. 71).  
Second and closely related (but controversial between GFCC and ECJ and among 
scholars) is whether other factors can disrupt the relationship between debt and 
spreads. In this regard, the GFCC followed the reasoning of the German Bundesbank by 
stating that “such interest rate spreads only reflect the scepticism of market participants 
that individual Member States will show sufficient budgetary discipline to stay 
permanently solvent” (GFCC, 2014, para. 71). The GFCC thus rejects the possibility that 
other than debt-related parameters significantly influence the bond spreads and that it 
considers it impossible to identify the justified and excessive parts of bond spreads – an 
analysis that is shared by some legal scholars (Siekmann, 2015; Ruffert, 2011) but 
stands in contrast to the findings of a number of empirical studies (Poghosyan, 2012; 
Santis, 2012) as well as the assessment of the ECJ. In this respect, the ECJ contradicted 
the referring court’s argument that the premia simply envisage differences in 
macroeconomic fundamentals between various euro area Member States (ECJ, 2015, 
para. 72). Again, the difference in arguments between the courts is empirical in nature – 
are other factors such as non-fundamentals or liquidity reasons really irrelevant for the 
determination of bond spreads as argued by the GFCC? And are the observed bond 
spreads justified or excessive parts of bond spreads? 
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Third, and connected to it, is the question of control over bond determinants. 
Interpreting Articles 123 and 125 TFEU as to set incentives for states to keep their 
budget in order necessarily requires entire control over the determinants of bond 
spreads by the respective country. The strict ban on interventions derived from Articles 
123 and 125 TFEU only makes sense if governments keep the determinants influencing 
the bond spreads under control because otherwise the prohibition of intervention 
would not reach its goal in setting the right incentives (i.e. maintaining budgetary 
discipline). This raises an additional empirical question, namely whether the factors 
influencing the bond spreads can be steered by governments, especially during times of 
crisis. 
The empirical arguments presented reveal a difference in the contingency upon 
empirical assumption in the jurisprudence of the GFCC and the ECJ, respectively. While 
the GFCC applies all three empirical claims (causality; debt as exclusive determinant; 
government’s control) rather strictly, the ECJ has seemingly relaxed the empirical 
ground by supporting its legal interpretation by reference to non-empirical reasons. For 
example, the ECJ’s decision paving the way for the creation of the ESM appears to 
balance the need for a higher common good (support is “indispensable to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States”) with respect for 
the ban on monetary financing (by subjecting this support to strict conditionality). In 
other words, the no-bailout clause is seen by the ECJ in relative rather than absolute 
terms suggesting that the ECJ’s jurisprudence cannot be explained by empirical 
assumptions only. The analysis will show, however, that interpreting the no-bailout 
clause in relative terms accurately accounts for the refinancing situations of a country in 
which the above empirical relationship do no longer exist. 
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III) Empirical part 
To analyze the determinants of the interest rate spreads in the EMS and the Eurozone, 
we specify the following fixed-effect econometric model.  
Sit = a + bFit + ai + uit      (1) 
where Sit  is the interest rate spread of country i in period t. The spread is defined as the 
difference between country i’s 10-year government bond rate and the German 10-year 
government bond rate.  a is the constant term and  ai  is country i’s fixed effect. The 
latter variable measures the idiosyncrasies of a country that affect its spread and that 
are not time dependent. For example, the efficiency of the tax system, the quality of the 
governance, the population structure and many other variables that are country-specific 
are captured by the fixed effect. Fit is a set of fundamental variables.  A fixed effect model 
helps to control for unobserved time-invariant variables and produces unbiased 
estimates of the “interested variables”. 
In the second step, following De Grauwe and Ji (2013), we introduce time dummies into 
the basic model and the specification is as follows: 
Sit = a + bFit + ai + et + uit      (2) 
where et  is a set of time dummy variables. This measures the common time effects that 
are unrelated to the fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If 
significant, it shows that the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamental forces 
driving the yields. It will allow us to evaluate the importance of fundamental economic 
factors and time effects. The latter can be interpreted as market sentiments unrelated to 
fundamentals. To deal with possible differences in time effects between the core and 
periphery country groups, as suggested in the literature, we also introduce different 
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time dummies. cet represents the common time effects for the core Eurozone group and 
pet for the periphery Eurozone group.  
Sit = a + bFit + ai + cet + pet + uit                               (3) 
The set of economic and monetary variables 𝐹𝑖𝑡 include the most common fundamental 
variables found in the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond spreads.3 They 
are variables measuring the sustainability of government debt. We will use the debt to 
GDP ratio, the fiscal space of the government, the budget deficit, the current account 
position, the real effective exchange rate and the rate of economic growth as 
fundamental variables affecting the spreads. The effects of these fundamental variables 
on the spreads can be described as follows.  
 When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service 
increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an 
increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate 
them for the increased default risk.  We also add debt to GDP ratio squared. The 
reason of focusing on the non-linear relationship comes from the fact that every 
decision to default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high potential losses. Thus, as 
the debt to GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come closer to the default 
decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the debt to GDP ratio 
(Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)). 
                                                            
3 Attinasi, M., et al. (2009), Arghyrou and Kontonikas(2010), Gerlach, et al.(2010), Schuknecht, et al.(2010), 
Caceres, et al.(2010), Caporale, and Girardi  (2011), Gibson, et al. (2011), De Grauwe and Ji (2012), 
Aizenman and Hutchinson(2012), Beirne and Fratzscher(2012).  There is of course a vast literature on the 
spreads in the government bond markets in general. See for example the classic Eaton, Gersovitz and 
Stiglitz(1986) and Eichengreen and Mody(2000). Much of this literature has been influenced by the debt 
problems of emerging economies. See for example, Edwards(1984), Edwards(1986) and Min(1998). 
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As an alternative measure of fiscal sustainability we will also use the fiscal space of 
the government. This is defined as the ratio of the government debt to total tax 
revenues. It has been used by Aizenman and Hutchinson(2012). It measures the 
capacity of governments to raise the taxes necessary to service the debt.  An increase 
of the fiscal space variable raises the spreads. Similar to the debt to GDP ratio 
specification, we will also consider a non-linear relationship between the spread and 
fiscal space. As the fiscal space variable increases, investors realize that they come 
closer to the default decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the 
fiscal space. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio and the fiscal space variables are stock variables. As a 
robustness test it will also be useful to use the government budget deficit (a flow 
variable).  This has the same expected effects on the spreads as the government debt 
to GDP ratio.  
 The current account has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account deficits 
should be interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the country as a whole 
(private and official residents).  This is also likely to increase the default risk of the 
government for the following reason. If the increase in net foreign debt arises from 
the private sector’s overspending it will lead to default risk of the private sector. 
However, the government is likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a 
negative effect on economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues and 
an increase in government budget deficits. If the increase in net foreign indebtedness 
arises from government overspending, it directly increases the government’s debt 
service, and thus the default risk. To capture net foreign debt position of a country, 
we use the accumulated current account GDP ratio of that country. It is computed as 
the current account accumulated since 2000Q1 divided by GDP.  
Commented [JY1]: We correct a mistake: the definition 
of fiscal space is the ratio of the government debt to 
total tax revenues. Therefore it is considered as stock 
concept  
Commented [JY2]: We add the non-linearity 
concerning fiscal space. 
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 The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered 
as an early warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real 
appreciation will run into problems of competitiveness which in turn will lead to 
future current account deficits, and future debt problems. Investors may then 
demand an additional risk premium.  
 Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing its 
debt. The lower the growth rate the more difficult it is to raise tax revenues. As a 
result a decline of economic growth will increase the incentive of the government to 
default, raising the default risk and the spread. 
The fundamental variables can be seen as “early warning” variables. They would be in 
the list of variables that agents trying to forecast the future sustainability of the 
government debt would use to make these forecasts. Thus, our model can be interpreted 
to use the current debt to GDP ratio (alternatively the current fiscal space) and the other 
fundamental variables to obtain forecasts of the future sustainability of the government 
debt.   
We could also have used the forecasts about the future sustainability of the government 
debt that were made in each period t. The IMF, for example, makes such forecasts. 
However, it appears that these forecasts are very unreliable producing large errors. In 
addition, there is the risk that these forecasts are not exogenous, i.e. that they depend on 
the spreads. Put differently, when the spreads increase, say on the Greek government 
bonds, forecasters typically react by adjusting their forecasts of the future sustainability 
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of the Greek government debt. As a result of this endogeneity of the forecasts our 
estimates will be biased. For these reasons we have not pursued this approach4.  
From the preceding it follows that we can interpret the set of fundamental variables as 
signaling present and future solvency problems of governments issuing debt. Changes in 
these variables create spreads reflecting solvency risk. In contrast the time dummies 
that, as will be remembered, are independent from the fundamental variables and 
therefore are not associated with solvency risk, create spreads that by default should be 
associated with liquidity risks that arise from self-fulfilling fears that sovereigns may not 
be able to rollover their debt. 
There is a potential issue of omitted variables here. Our previous conclusion holds 
provided the model incorporates all relevant fundamental variables. If we fail to 
incorporate some relevant fundamental variables this conclusion will not hold anymore. 
We have used here the prevailing economic literature that has identified the 
fundamentals that matter.  There is one exception, though. Some of the econometric 
studies of the spreads have used measures of risk such as the CDS-spreads as exogenous 
variables explaining the spreads in the government bond markets (see Aizenman and 
Hutchinson (2012), Beirne and Fratzscher (2012)). We have criticized this approach in 
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) on the ground that these measures of risk are not exogenous 
variables. During moments of crisis risk perception increases and the sovereign debt 
and CDS spreads increase simultaneously.  In no way can it be concluded that the CDS-
spreads are exogenous variables causing the sovereign debt spreads to increase. Adding 
                                                            
4 One could try to solve this problem by using the forecasts made in t-1. However, according to the 
theory, forecasts made in period t-1 can only affect spreads in t-1. In period t these past forecasts 
should have no inflluence anymore on the spreads except if these past forecasts turn out to be wrong.   
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the CDS-spreads into the regression may improve the statistical fitness without however 
adding explanatory power.  
 
We run regressions on equation (1), (2) and (3) using a sample of the ten original 
Eurozone countries (without Luxembourg) during 2000-2015 (quarterly data). We did 
not select the countries that joined the Eurozone after the sovereign debt crisis. It would 
not be appropriate to include these countries as they experienced a very different 
monetary regime during most of the sample period. Note also that Germany is included 
as the benchmark country. 
 
After having established by a Hausman test that the random effect model is 
inappropriate, we used a fixed effect model to analyze the long-term bond spreads in the 
Eurozone. Table 1 presents regressions of the Eurozone countries using the proposed 
fixed effect models. The standard errors (in brackets) correct for the existence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms and for contemporaneous correlation across 
panels.  
 
Regressions shown in columns (1) to (3) use the model with the debt to GDP ratio as a 
measure of debt sustainability. Regression (1) does not have time dummies; regression 
(2) adds common time dummies for all countries and regression (3) has separate time 
dummies for the periphery countries. Regression (4) adds the budget deficit to GDP 
ratio and regression (5) used fiscal space as the alternative measure of fiscal 
sustainability.  
We find that fundamental variables have a significant effect on the spreads in these 
regressions, except for the real exchange rate and the budget deficit variable. The fiscal 
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space variable provides similar significant results as the debt-to-GDP ratio. Adding time 
dummies in regressions (2) and (3) has improved the R2 (goodness of the fit of the 
model). We conduct two F tests on the time dummies and both tests reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The first F test suggests that 
time fixed effects are needed and the regression with time dummies is shown in column 
(2) of Table 1.  Moreover, the second F test suggests that different time fixed effects are 
needed for core and periphery country groups and the regression is shown column (3). 
Regression (3) gives the best R2 after allowing for two different time dummies on the 
periphery and core countries. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as follows. 
Increasing government debt ratios lead in a non-linear way to higher spreads. From the 
estimated coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms we find that the two terms 
together start being positive when the debt ratio reaches 149. However, to find the effect 
of changes in the spread we have to take the derivative of -0.0745x + 0.0005x2  (where x 
= debt/GDP). This yields -0.0745 + 0.001x. Solving for x we find  x = 74.5, i.e. when the 
debt ratio exceeds 74.5% increases in the debt ratio start increasing the spread. We show 
the estimated non-linear relationship between spreads and the debt to GDP ratio in 
figure A1 in appendix. 
The real exchange rate has the expected negative sign but the estimated coefficients are 
not statistically different from zero.  The economic growth variable has the expected 
negative and significant effect on the spreads, i.e. a decline in economic growth raises 
the spreads as it reduces the capacity of governments to generate tax revenues 
necessary to service the debt.  This is a result that is often found in the literature (see 
Aizenman and Hutchinson (2012), Beirne and Fratzscher (2012)). 
We also find a significant effect of accumulated current accounts on the spreads, 
however, the coefficient has the wrong (negative) sign. In De Grauwe and Ji (2013) 
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several robustness tests were produced. First, it was found that in the pre-crisis period 
(1999-2007) the coefficient of the accumulated current accounts is zero. The negative 
sign is obtained only for the post-crisis period. Second, when estimating the model for 
the core and the periphery countries separately, it is found that the negative coefficient 
only applies to the core countries. The periphery countries exhibit a coefficient equal to 
zero. Our interpretation is the following. The negative coefficient on the accumulated 
current account appears after the crisis and only in the subsample of core countries. The 
reason may be that core countries that had accumulated large current account surpluses 
(Belgium, Netherlands) also saw their spreads increase (vis-à-vis Germany) after the 
crisis. We conclude that the current account variable does not provide for a reliable 
estimate of future sustainability of the government debt.   
 
Statistical significance is one thing; economic significance is another one. We also want 
to know what the economic significance is of the fundamental variables. Put differently, 
we want to measure the quantitative importance of the fundamental variables in 
explaining the movements in the spreads.  
In order to obtain information on the economic significance of the fundamentals we 
have to compare these with the effect of the time dummy variable. We use regression (3) 
in Table 1 with different time components for the core (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Italy) and the periphery (Spain, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece) Eurozone groups. We show the estimated time components (associated with 
regression (3)) in Figure 1.  The shaded areas indicate the time dummies that are 
significantly different from zero. This confirms the existence of significant time 
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components that led to deviations of the spreads from the underlying fundamentals and 
thus were signaling risks unrelated to solvency5.  
This time effect is especially pronounced in the periphery countries. In particular we 
find that in the periphery countries, there was a surge of the spreads during the 
sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2012 that was independent of the movements in the 
fundamentals. In 2012 there was the OMT-announcement, and we observe that the 
spreads decline forcefully, again independently of the movements of the fundamentals. 
Thus, it appears that the announcement of OMT by itself, triggered a large decline in the 
spreads that could not be associated with improvements in the fundamentals. 
The period prior to the crisis is also interesting. We find that prior to the crisis the time 
dummy becomes increasingly negative. This suggests that the financial markets were 
increasingly disregarding the fundamentals (some of which were deteriorating in the 
periphery) and kept the spreads close to zero. Put differently, investors appear to have 
disregarded the risks of holding sovereign debt from the periphery despite the warnings 
given by deteriorating fundamentals. The emergence of the crisis can be seen as a wake-
up call, which then led investors to overreact and even to panic, producing spreads that 
(again) were out of line with the underlying fundamentals. The OMT announced by the 
ECB allowed the fear factor to disappear. This then led to a steep decline in the spreads, 
that again cannot be explained by the fundamentals in the model.  All this seems to 
suggest that financial markets can easily switch from modes of risk-denial to excessive 
risk perception. 
 
                                                            
5 In De Grauwe and Ji (2013) we applied the same procedure on a sample of standalone OECD countries 
and could not find significant time dummies, suggesting that liquidity risks did not exist in these countries. 
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The next step in the analysis consists in estimating the contribution of the fundamentals 
and the time dummy in explaining the movements in the spreads. We perform this 
exercise during two periods. The first one is the crisis period, starting from 2008Q1 until 
2012Q2 (just before the OMT-announcement). The second (post-OMT) period runs from 
2012Q3 to 2015Q2. We show the results in Figures 2 and 3.   
We find that during the crisis period, the time dummy is by far the largest explanatory 
factor in explaining the surge of the spreads for Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In the case 
of Greece, fundamentals have a somewhat higher importance: they explain 44% of the 
surge in the Greek spread.  
The post OMT-period shows a similar pattern. The time variable explains by far the 
largest part of the decline in the spreads observed since 2012, suggesting that the 
decline in the spreads was made possible mostly by the OMT-announcement. Changes in 
the fundamentals do not seem to have contributed much in explaining this decline. 
Since the legal arguments focus on the influence of the government debt to GDP ratio it 
will be useful to repeat the previous exercise and to isolate the separate effect of the 
debt to GDP ratio on the spreads during the two periods. We show the results of this 
exercise in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the decomposition during the crisis period 
2008-12.  We find that the changes in the government debt to GDP ratio observed during 
that period contributed very little to the surge of the spreads. This surge is mainly 
explained by the time dummy, measuring market sentiments, and to a lesser degree by 
the deterioration of the other fundamentals (economic growth).  This suggests that the 
surge of the spreads during the crisis was unrelated to the movements of the most 
important fundamental variable, i.e. de government debt to GDP ratio.  
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Figure 5 shows the same decomposition during the post-OMT period (2012-15). Again 
we find that the changes in the government debt ratio explain only a small fraction of the 
decline in the spreads. This decline is mainly driven by the market sentiment variable 
and by the other fundamental variables, in particular by the change in economic growth 
which has some, albeit relatively small, influence. As the fundamentals improved 
somewhat they tended to reinforce the effect of market sentiments.   
In this empirical section we have provided evidence showing that during the sovereign 
debt crisis the surge of the spreads was determined mostly by market sentiments, which 
we measured by time dummies that are independent from underlying economic 
fundamentals.  In addition, we found that the changes in the debt to GDP ratios observed 
during this period had practically no influence on the increase in the spreads. Other 
fundamentals, in particular the decline in economic growth had some, but relatively 
small influence. 
The conclusions from the empirical analysis of the post-OMT period are similar. The 
rapid decline in the spreads during 2012-15 was triggered mainly by positive market 
sentiments, which are likely to have been the result of the OMT-announcement. The 
changes in the fundamentals, and in particular the changes in the debt to GDP ratios, had 
very little impact on the spreads. 
 
These empirical results suggest that the sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 2010 and 
that led to spectacular increases in the sovereign bond rates of a number of countries 
was not the result of deteriorating government debt positions, but from market 
sentiments of panic and fear, and to lesser degree a decline in growth. Put differently, 
Commented [JY3]: Revised according to reviewer 2 
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the surge of the spreads during 2010-12 was reflecting market sentiments in which 
panic and fear led investors to massively sell government bonds. These then in a self-
fulfilling way triggered a liquidity squeeze making it increasingly difficult for the 
governments concerned to rollover their debt.  
 
IV) Legal implications of empirical findings 
The above empirical results offer insight for the legal interpretation of the no-bailout 
clause (Article 125 TFEU) and the ban on monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU). While 
a caveat for general legal inferences must be made given the specificity of the legal 
reviews and the empirical context, the analysis allows drawing certain conclusions as to 
the scope of these norms and their application in reviewing the lawfulness of EU debt 
crisis instruments. 
First, the conventional interpretation of the no-bailout principle and the ban on 
monetary financing assuming a causal relationship between a country’s debt position 
and its refinancing possibilities should be rejected at least in crisis times. In these 
circumstances, the impact of debt indicators becomes marginal (and may even have an 
ambivalent effect). A purely debt-focused interpretation of these norms is thus not in 
line with empirical evidence. 
Second, market fears become a predominant driver of spreads in times of crisis 
highlighting the relevance of liquidity issues. This implies that interpreting Articles 123 
and 125 TFEU as enforcing a market logic through strict application of these norms 
without considerations to liquidity and other non-debt related indicators does not 
capture the multiple factors causing a country’s refinancing difficulties. Rather, the 
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dominance of liquidity concerns as drivers for government spreads underscores that a 
lender of last resort is necessary to intervene in times of liquidity dry-up (De Grauwe, 
2011b; Steinbach, 2016). This should particularly be reflected in the interpretation of 
Article 123 TFEU governing the ECB’s scope for interventions. The prohibition of 
monetary financing should not apply to situations where liquidity (not solvency) is the 
driving force. Similar to the no-bailout rule, the ban’s intention to maintain market 
pressure must be assessed in light of the factors impeding the smooth functioning of 
monetary policy – this extends to unjustified spreads due to market sentiments as 
shown above. This finding further underscores the validity of the ECJ’s reference to non-
empirical grounds of interpretation. More specifically and as mentioned above, in 
Pringle the ECJ referred to the indispensability “to safeguard the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and of its Member States” as ground for interpreting the no-bailout 
clause in relative terms. 
Third, the conventional interpretation of the above norms presumes a country’s control 
over the parameters causing certain spread patterns. In that view, market pressure 
preserved through strict prohibition of bailouts ensure proper incentives to solid 
economic policy. This view should not only be rejected given the marginal relevance of 
debt for spreads. Also, other fundamentals are of limited relevance and often they 
cannot be directly influenced, as competitiveness (e.g. wage bargaining) and economic 
growth depend heavily on factors outside of a government’s reach. In addition, liquidity 
shortages reflecting market fears are disconnected from government’s policy influence. 
Fourth, an interpretation of the above norms allowing account for non-debt related 
parameters (and particularly for liquidity concerns) suggests the lawfulness of the 
policy instruments adopted to counter liquidity shortages, in particular the ESM and the 
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OMT programme. Both of these measures have been setup to address the above 
phenomenon of liquidity shortages. However, in its judgment on the OMT programme, 
the GFCC relied on the the argument made by the German Bundesbank, according to 
which it is impossible to “divide interest rate spreads into a rational and an irrational 
part” (GFCC, 2014, para. 71). In the proceedings, the Bundesbank had criticized the 
unfeasibility of determining to what extent risk premiums reflect economic 
fundamentals or other factors. The above empirical analysis rejects this point of view 
and rather supports the ECB’s intention to restore regular monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms by neutralising unjustified interest spreads on government bonds.6 Thus, 
an empirically sound legal assessment should consider both nature and scope of factors 
underlying bond spreads. The ECJ’s interpretation of Article 123 TFEU to accept 
unjustified interest rates to hamper monetary policy even if potentially lifting budgetary 
pressure is in line with above demonstration of empirical findings. 
Fifth, further legal inferences can be drawn as to the appropriate legal basis for 
reviewing the legality of crisis tools. As mentioned above, the scope of no-bailout 
principle and the ban on monetary financing have to be widened abandoning a purely 
debt focus and making the application of these norms dependent on non-debt related 
parameters. Moreover, Article 122 TFEU (the so-called emergency clause) might capture 
the empirical reality more accurately than the no-bailout principle. This provision 
allows a bailout activity of the EU via financial assistance “where a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters 
                                                            
6 It is acknowledged that there is no “proof” of “irrational effects”, as there is no random assignment, nor 
instrumentation. In a strict sense, one cannot exclude that there are omitted variables. But strict 
econometric proof is out of reach in this context. More importantly, the analysis shows that the position of 
the GFCC is purely speculative. 
23 
 
or exceptional occurrences beyond its control …”.7 This legal provision offers leeway in 
taking into account a variety of factors going beyond the debt focus of Article 125 TFEU. 
More specifically, liquidity issues impeding a country’s refinancing ability may then be 
considered in times of crisis as “exceptional occurrences” within the meaning of this 
norm. Also, the norm’s requirement of “beyond its control” is respected where market 
sentiments are entirely disconnected from fundamental as shown above. The emergency 
provision should thus be interpreted as allowing financial assistance in case of 
temporary liquidity problems. 
Finally, the analysis (particularly, the relevance of time dummies) has revealed not only 
different types of risk (solvency versus liquidity) but possibly also, more broadly, 
different types of risk processes (deterministic versus stochastic). Hence, the focus on 
solvency risks may be considered as overly deterministic, while the liquidity risks 
associated with crises highlights the relevance of stochastic factors. Such an 
interpretative framework underscores the need for an alternative legal basis and/or 
instruments under certain circumstances.  
V) Conclusions 
Controversies surrounding the legality of financial assistance to countries in crisis have 
loomed prominently over the last few years. However, both legal analysis as well as 
relevant jurisprudence rarely (or insufficiently) care about the validity of the empirical 
claims underlying their legal findings. This analysis sought to fill this gap and discuss the 
most relevant norms governing the debt crisis in the euro zone by testing the empirical 
                                                            
7 (emphasis added). This exception was used as a legal basis for the EFSM Regulation 407/2010. The EU 
viewed that the difficulties within the meaning of Article 122 TEU may be caused by a serious deterioration 
in the international economic and financial environment, see Regulation 407/2010, paras. 2-5. 
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hypotheses implicit in the conventional legal doctrine, which heavily relies on the 
relationship between a country’s debt position (and thus its solvency) and the spreads. 
In the jurisprudence, the GFCC pursued this conventional doctrine rather strictly, while 
the ECJ interpreted the relevant legal norms in more relative terms thus accounting for 
the fragility of the assumed empirical relationships.  
Our econometric study has highlighted the fragility of the legal reasoning and suggested 
a re-interpretation of the relevant norms. Most importantly, a legal regime governing the 
lawfulness of financial assistance cannot be limited to debt parameters but must 
consider the impact of other fundamentals on spreads and, in particular, the liquidity 
situation as a result of market sentiments during crisis periods. Taking into account non-
debt related factors suggests an application of the no-bailout principle and the ban on 
monetary financing to the effect that crisis instruments allowing liquidity supply (OMT) 
and financial assistance (ESM) can empirically be justified and should be considered 
lawful. Future application of legal standards should incorporate the emergency clause 
laid down in Article 122 TFEU as legal basis for exceptional financial assistance to 
account for factors out of a country’s control causing financial distress (e.g. extreme 
market fears), which a narrow interpretation of the no-bailout principle is unable to 
capture. Finally, the ban on monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU) should be 
interpreted as compatible with the ECB acting as lender of last resort in order to reduce 
the impact of non-fundamental impact on government spreads.  
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Source: own calculations 
Note:  The vertical axis shows the coefficient of the time dummies using regression (3). It is to be 
interpreted as percentage points of the spreads. Thus when the coefficient of the time dummy is 5%, 
as it was in 2012, this means that the spreads were 5 percentage points higher than the spread as 
determined by the fundamentals. 
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Figure 1: Time dummies of spread (%)
p<5% & p<1% Core Periphery
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        Source: own calculations 
        Note:  with “predicted” we mean the value of the spreads as estimated by the model.  
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Figure 2. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to 
predicted changes in spreads % (2008Q1-2012Q2)
Change in fundamentals Change in time component (market sentiment)
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        Source: own calculations 
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Figure 3. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to 
predicted changes in spreads % (2012Q2-2015Q2)
Change in fundamentals Change in time component (market sentiment)
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             Source: own calculations 
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Figure 4: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals 
and time dummy in changin spreads (2008-12)
Change in other fundamentals
Change in debt
Change in time component (market sentiment)
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Source: own calculations 
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Figure 5: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals 
and time dummy in changing spreads (2012--15)
Change in other fundamentals
Change in debt
Change in time component (market sentiment)
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APPENDIX 
 
Note: This figure represents the non-linear effect of the government debt ratio on the 
spreads as estimated in Table 1 (column 3). 
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Figure A1: Spread and debt ratio
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Table 1   Estimation Results on Spread (%) 
Sample period: 2000Q1-2015Q2 
 
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Breusch-Pagan LM test is used confirm cross-sectional correlation in the disturbances.  
Standard errors are in brackets assuming that the disturbances are heteroskedastic and 
contemporaneously correlated across panels. 
Data sources: the government debt to GDP ratio, the fiscal space, the real effective exchange rate (defined 
as the relative unit labour costs and expressed as an index with base year 2005), the current accounts and 
the growth rate of GDP are all obtained from Eurostat. 
1F test on time dummies: F( 61, 544) =  5.10. F test rejects the null that the coefficients for all quarters are 
jointly equal to zero, therefore time fixed effects are needed. 
2F test on periphery time dummies: F(61, 483) =4.88. F test rejects the null that the coefficients for all 
quarters are jointly equal to zero, therefore different time fixed effects are needed for core and periphery 
country groups. 
3The time dummies in regression (3) are shown in Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt GDP ratio  -0.0292* -0.0416*** -0.0745*** -0.0716***  
 [0.0153] [0.0150] [0.0166] [0.0184]  
Debt GDP ratio squared 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***  
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]  
Real effective exchange rate -0.0318 -0.3985 -0.7420 -0.7502 -0.8786 
 [0.8769] [1.0396] [0.9237] [0.9234] [0.9092] 
Accumulated current account GDP ratio  -0.6134*** -0.4849*** -0.4856*** -0.4830*** -0.8155*** 
(%) [0.1379] [0.1215] [0.1081] [0.1081] [0.1129] 
Growth rate of GDP -0.2301*** -0.3404*** -0.2259*** -0.2322*** -0.2596*** 
(%) [0.0393] [0.0531] [0.0457] [0.0524] [0.0510] 
Deficit GDP ratio    0.0160 0.0146 
(%)    [0.0317] [0.0307] 
Fiscal space      -3.5953*** 
     [1.0034] 
Fiscal space squared     0.7246*** 
     [0.2316] 
Time fixed effects (quarterly) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects periphery countries No No Yes Yes Yes 
F test on main economic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test on time dummies  Yes1             Yes3 Yes Yes 
F test on periphery time dummies   Yes2,3 Yes Yes 
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 
R2 0.660 0.784 0.866 0.866 0.857 
